Policy Uncertainty, Symbiosis, and the Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Conservativeness by Giovanni Di Bartolomeo et al.
  1




Giovanni Di Bartolomeo 
University of Teramo 
gdibartolomeo@unite.it 
Marco Manzo 
Ministry of Economics and OECD 
marco.manzo@agenziadogane.it 
Francesco Giuli 






Abstract.  This paper extends a well-known macroeconomic stabilization 
game between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced by Dixit and 
Lambertini (American Economic Review, 93: 1522-1542) to multiplicative 
(policy) uncertainty. We find that even if fiscal and monetary authorities 
share a common output and inflation target (i.e. the symbiosis assumption), 
the achievement of the common targets is no longer guaranteed; under 
multiplicative uncertainty, in fact, a time consistency problem arises unless 
policymakers’ output target is equal to the natural level.  
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1. Introduction 
Lane (2004) examines the effect of policy uncertainty in the European Union, 
he finds that multiplicative or model uncertainty is a relevant feature of the 
European policymaking process. Model uncertainty affects policy-makers’ 
interactions, especially those between fiscal and monetary authorities. Lane 
(2004) suggests that incorporating multiplicative uncertainty into monetary 
and fiscal policy formulations is an important modeling priority.
1 Model 
uncertainty is empirically relevant also for the United States; for instance, by 
exploiting archives of the model code, coefficients, baseline databases and 
stochastic shock sets stored after each FOMC meeting between 1996 and 
2003, Ironside and Tetlow (2007) document how uncertainty is a substantial 
problem of the Fed policymaking process. More in general, Taylor (1999) 
argues that the developments of information technology increase uncertainty 
about the policymaking process and thus it should increase the interests of 
economist in studying and modeling its effects. 
In a pioneering study, Brainard (1967)
2 shows that multiplicative uncertainty 
makes the policy-maker more prudent, i.e. under model uncertainty the 
policy-maker reacts less to disturbances than in the case of certainty.
3 More 
recently, Peersman and Smets (1999) and Soderstrom (2002) have extended 
                                                 
1 Similar conclusions have been derived by Dornbusch et al. (1998), Mihov (2001) and ECB 
(2001) more specifically for monetary policy. They claim that the creation of European 
Monetary Union is likely to have strengthened the degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
transmission of monetary policy measures within the union. 
2 Indeed, multiplicative (or parameter) uncertainty was first introduced by Holt (1962), who 
showed that policy performance would deteriorate when model parameters are uncertain. 
3   Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989: 64-67) gives a comprehensive description of 
multiplicative uncertainty and compare it to additive uncertainty.   3
the Brainard’s argument to monetary policy in the European Monetary Union 
context. 
In the spirit of Lane’s (2004) observations, a number of authors have 
attempted to model and evaluate multiplicative uncertainty by considering its 
effects on optimal monetary policy;
4 in a similar manner, other researchers 
have focused on the effects of different kind of uncertainty in the conduct of 
fiscal policy.
5  However, despite the increasing number of studies, the 
importance of uncertainty in the interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies has been neglected; hence, the Lane’s (2004) observations have been 
only partially considered. Our aim is to fill this gap. 
Acknowledging the relevance of uncertainty on the effects of policymakers’ 
choices, we evaluate the consequences which are produced on the effects of 
fiscal policy by the introduction of multiplicative uncertainty in a class of 
policy games recently developed by Dixit and Lambertini (D&L from now 
onwards).
6  
D&L’s models have are particular attractive for our investigation since they 
consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary stabilization policies in 
a rather general manner since they consider different assumptions about the 
transmission mechanisms of the policies. In addition, model uncertainty can 
be easily introduced in this class of models since D&L observe that additive 
uncertainty is a very restrictive case and, thus, assume that the private sector 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Peersman and Smets (1999), Svensson (1999), 
Rudebusch (2001, 2002), Giannoni (2002), Lawler (2002), Schellekens (2002), Söderström 
(2002), Walsh (2003: Section 4). 
5 See Dupuis and Hostland (2001), Auerbach and Hassett (2002, 2007). 
6 See D&L (2001, 2003a, and 2003b.) See also Lambertini (2006).   4
is subjected to multiplicative uncertainty.
7  
One of the main findings of D&L is related to the effects of the symbiosis 
assumption. Symbiosis means that fiscal and monetary authorities share 
identical (ideal or desired) output and inflation targets, but not necessary 
equal marginal rate of substitutions between these objectives in their 
preference functions. D&L (2003b) find that symbiosis implies that ideal 
output and inflation will be always achieved; otherwise policymakers’ 
non-cooperative interactions always lead to inefficient equilibria (see D&L, 
2001). Although this result is obtained in a monetary union, it holds also in a 
single country.
8 Thus, for the sake of brevity, we will only consider the case 
of one country, but our results can be easily extended to a monetary union. 
We leave this task to further researches. 
Our paper studies the effects of multiplicative uncertainty on the stabilization 
policy under the symbiosis assumption.
9 We show that uncertainty may be no 
longer neutral (for average outcomes) and may imply different results. In 
particular, the symbiosis assumption does no longer guarantee the 
achievement of ideal targets unless the policymakers’ ideal output is equal to 
its natural level, i.e. no cheating incentive. Differently from the perfect 
information case, a time consistency problem arises, which also implies that 
monetary and fiscal authorities have to be more conservative than the society 
in order to minimize a generic social welfare loss.  
                                                 
7 In their model policy-makers do not face uncertainty since they observe all the shocks in the 
Rogoff’s (1983) tradition. 
8 See Lambertini (2006) for a discussion.  
9 Of course, by assuming additive uncertainty, it is trivial to show that D&L’s results on 
fiscal-monetary interactions hold in expected terms, because of the certainty equivalence. It 
is worth recalling that all the models discussed are linear-quadratic games.   5
We restrict ourselves to the case of multiplicative uncertainty on the 
inflationary effects of fiscal policy and policymakers’ simultaneous 
interactions (the D&L basis case), for the sake of brevity. Robustness of our 
results to different kinds of multiplicative uncertainty and game timing will 
be however discussed. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 describes the effects of uncertainty and discusses the robustness of 
our results. Section 4 studies the optimal design for fiscal and monetary 
authorities by considering a general social welfare function. A final section 
concludes.  
 
2. The economic benchmark
10 
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They depend on the deviations of inflation (π ) and real output ( y ) from 
common targets, π
∗ and  y
∗ (i.e. symbiosis assumption). More in details,  G L  
and  B L  indicate the government’s and central bank’s preferences and  G θ  and 
B θ  are the government’s and central bank’s marginal rate of substitution 
between inflation and real output deviations from the target expressed in 
terms of inflation, respectively. Note that the symbiosis assumption does not 
imply equal marginal rate of substitutions between the two policy-makers. 
                                                 
10  Our model is a one-country version of D&L (2003b) augmented by multiplicative 
uncertainty for policy-makers.   6
We assume  BG θ θ ≤ , i.e. a conservative central banker.
11  
The economic model is given by two equations: 
(2) 
e yyb a x ππ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ − +  
(3)  0 cx π πµ =+   
where  y  is the natural level of real output, 
e π  are is private sector expected 
inflation, and x and  0 π  are fiscal and monetary policy indicators. As usual, 
we assume that, due to distortions in the good markets, the natural level of 
real output may be too low from a social point of view. This implies:  yy
∗ > . 
We assume that policy-makers cannot observe a multiplicative shock, i.e. 
2 1 µ µ σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ , ∼   (for similar specifications, see, among others, Letterie, 1997; 
Pearce and Sobue, 1997; Lawler, 2002; Schellekens, 2002).
12 Note that the 
introduction of an additive shock does not affect the (average) outcome and 
the optimal policy of the model because of the linear-quadratic nature of the 
game.  




⎝⎠ −  is 
the usual supply effect of surprise inflation ( 0 b > ). The effect of fiscal policy 
on real output can be either positive, for Keynesian demand effects, or 
negative, for crowding out effects, but the algebra of the model is of course 
the same in the two cases. Inflation is described by equation (3) as the sum of 
a component controlled by the central bank,  0 π , and a further contribution 
                                                 
11 Cf. Rogoff (1985) and Lambertini (2006). 
12 For the sake of brevity, we here consider only a multiplicative shock on fiscal policy 
effectiveness, but the robustness of our results with respect to different stochastic structures 
will be later discussed.   7
arising from fiscal policy. This may be due to the fact that the central bank is, 
in practice, forced to accommodate fiscal expansion to some extent, or to a 
change in the equilibrium price of goods depending on the balance between 
the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and on costs, produced by 
changes in tax distortions or public investment. Thus c can have either signs 
and for our scope we assume  0 c >  and  0 a > .
13  
By minimizing the government’s loss function with respect to the fiscal 
instrument subject to equations (2) and (3), we obtain the following first order 
condition: 
(4)  () 0 0 G Ec ac b y y µππ µ θ
⎡⎤ ∗∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ −+ + − =  
In a similar manner we obtain the central bank’s first order condition: 
(5)  0 0 B Eb y y ππ θ
⎡⎤ ∗∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ − +− =   
It should be noticed that the optimal monetary policy (equation (5)) is 
unaffected by multiplicative uncertainty. This is so because we have 
considered the Nash equilibrium and we assumed that the shock is only on the 
fiscal instrument.
14  
If the (multiplicative) shock is perfectly observed by both the central bank 
and the government, by use of equations (4) and (5) it is easy to verify that 
yy
∗ =  and π π
∗ =  , as the model collapses to D&L’s (2003b) one.
15  
 
                                                 
13  See D&L (2003a, 2003b) for an extensive discussion about the model and of its 
micro-foundations. For technical details see D&L (2003a: Appendix A), which is available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/appendix_aer.pdf. Regarding the robustness of our 
results to different policy transmission mechanisms, see Section 4. 
14 See Section 4 for a discussion on result robustness with respect to difference source of 
multiplicative uncertainty.   8
3. Shocks and symbiosis 
We now consider the case of an unknown shock. As we said above, optimal 
monetary policy is not affected by multiplicative uncertainty, whereas the 
government’s expected-reaction function can be re-written as: 
(6)  () ()() ()
22 2 1 G
GG
bc c
yE y E x
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22 1 E µ µσ
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G π  indicates the reaction function of the government and  0
B π  that of 
the central bank.  
By inspecting equations (7) and (8), the government reacts to monetary 
policy by reducing the fiscal stance, it instead supports expansionary policies 
to contrast output gap or expected inflation. The intuition is immediate. If the 
economy is stabilized by the monetary authority the government is more 
                                                                                                                            
15 Indeed, if the multiplicative shocks are observed by both policy-makers. 
16 Note that  () 1 E µ µ ==  and  ()
2 2
() E E
µ σ µµ = − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ; thus the variance can be rewritten as 
[ ] [ ]
22 222 2 2 () 2 () 2 EE E E E
µ σµ µ µ µ µ µ µµ µ µ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+− =+ −= − .   9
likely to be inactive whereas greater distortions call for a greater fiscal 
activism. The central bank has a similar symmetric behaviour. 
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where  ( ) 1 0 GG B Aa a b c θθ θ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+− >  and 
22
2 1 G A bc θ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ . Unless 
2 0 µ σ = , 
equations (9) and (10) imply a policy inconsistency problem, since 
policy-makers are not able to neutralize the private sector action. From 
equations (9) and (10) is clear that the symbiosis result holds if and only if 
either 
2 0 µ σ =  or  yy
∗ = . In other words, it holds if the policy-makers do not 
face multiplicative uncertainty (as in D&L, 2003b); or if there is not a policy 
inconsistency problem.  
The rationale for the above result is driven by two forces: a strategic and an 
anticipation effect. First, multiplicative uncertainty on its policy makes the 
government more caution in reacting to the other variables and, therefore, in 
stabilizing the economy. A fiscal contraction thus stimulates monetary 
expansion since monetary and fiscal policies are substitutes.
17 For any level 
of price expectations, fiscal (monetary) policy is less (more) expansionary 
than in the perfect information case [strategic effect], where policies are 
consistent with the ideal outcome achievement. Moreover, the loose 
monetary policy stimulates price expectations that raise both monetary and 
                                                 
17 See the policy-makers’ reaction functions in the instrument space reported in Appendix A.   10
fiscal policy [anticipation effect].
18  As result, in equilibrium, the ideal 
outcomes are not achieved; output and inflation are lower and higher, 
respectively, than the policy-makers’ ideal values since the fiscal and 
monetary policy mix no longer offsets the private sector behavior: a 
traditional inflation bias emerges.  
Figure 1 synthesizes the economic mechanism by comparing the uncertainty 
and the perfect information cases. BB represents the central bank’s reaction 
function (which is not affected by uncertainty),  1 AA  is the government’s 




                                                 
18 Optimal policy implies equalization of marginal costs and benefits of an inflation increase. 
When expectations are high, the output is low. Thus the marginal gain of increasing inflation 
is also high because of policy-makers’ quadratic losses. Hence, higher expectations imply 
looser policies. See again the policy-makers’ reaction functions. 
19 Recall that, for 
C x x =  and  00
C π π = ,  yy
∗ =  and π π







For given private sector expectations, multiplicative uncertainty affects the 
slope of the government’s reaction function (from  1 AA  to  2 AA ), implying a 
tighter fiscal policy (
U x ) and a looser monetary policy ( 0
U π ), i.e., the strategic 
effect . Moreover, expected inflation associated with the pair (
U x ,  0
U π ) is 
higher than the expected inflation associated with (
C x ,  0
C π ).
20 Higher 
                                                 
20 In order to move from instruments to objectives, we need to draw equation (3) as the locus 
of inflation rates in the instrument space (dashed lines). This locus is represented by a set of 
parallel lines with a slope equal to  c −  and an intercept equal to the associated inflation. In 
the figure, higher dashed lines are associated with higher expected inflation rates. 
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expected inflation moves the reaction functions from  2 AA  to  AA
′′  and from 
BB to B B
′′ , i.e. the anticipation effect, and partially offsets the strategic 
effect on output gap whereas straightens its effects on inflation. The Nash 




⎩⎭ =, .  
In the Nash equilibrium, N , inflation rises over its ideal values and output 
falls below it since we know from the perfect information solution that 
e
C π ππ
∗ ==  and  C ya x yy
∗ =+ = . Formally, under uncertainty fiscal policy 
is 
NC x x <  and 
e π π = , hence output is lower than in the perfect information 
case since it is completely determined by x (see equation (2)). Equilibrium 
inflation can be found by using equation (3) and its intercept on the 0 π  axis: 
since the dashed line passing for N  is higher than that passing from C , 
under uncertainty inflation is higher than in the perfect information case.  
Before considering more in detail the effects of policy-makers’ uncertainty 
on the effects of fiscal policy, we would like to briefly discuss the robustness 
of our results
21 since: a) under perfect information, the symbiosis result holds 
also for Stackelberg equilibria;
22 b) a major drawback of the policy game 
approach is usually considered to be the lack of robustness.
23  
                                                 
21 For the sake of brevity, robustness is here only discussed in informal terms. Further results 
on other possible shock structure (including multiple correlated shocks) are available upon 
request from the authors. 
22 Indeed, D&L distinguish between leadership and commitment equlibria as possible game 
solutions different from the discretionary one. We discuss the robustness of our results only 
in the case of the D&L’s (Stackelberg) leadership equilibria. Commitment cannot be 
considered, either as state-contingent-linear or as non-linear rule, since the multiplicative 
shock is not observable before setting the policy (being a shock on policy effects and not on 
the state of the economy). 
23 In other words, the conclusions reached are often sensitive to the particular assumptions 
adopted to model the games. Even though the argument raised by this criticism is important,   13
By a considering a comprehensive taxonomy, we find that our main result is 
rather general. In fact, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee 
the achievement of ideal outcomes for all the possible game timing and all the 
possible forms of multiplicative uncertainty (irrespectively of the parameter 
signs),
24   with the exception of a single non-correlated shock on the 
semi-elasticity of the inflation surprise term (i.e. a shock on b  in equation 
(2)).  
The reason of the above exception is explained as follows. Multiplicative 
uncertainty influences the coefficient of the uncertain variables in the 
policy-makers’ first order conditions. Thus, in the case of multiplicative 
uncertainty on the impact of the inflation surprise (measured by b ), its effects 
on the policy-makers’ reactions are fully offset by the rationality of 
expectations, which implies a zero value for expected inflation surprise in 
equilibrium.  
Summarizing, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to guarantee the 
achievement of ideal outcomes under a very general set of assumptions. 
However, it should be noticed that different assumptions entail quite different 
policy implications, which here are not fully discussed.
25   
                                                                                                                            
it would be important to distinguish, as argued by Kreps (1990), between the assumptions 
which are made on the equilibrium concept and on the players’ preference functions which 
are used. Whereas the existence of different equilibrium concepts is a source of improvement 
for the “economic science,” their misuse is an impoverishment. Similarly, even though minor 
changes in the analytical model and in agents' preferences may result in quite different 
features in the performance of economic systems. This is in the nature of the economic 
process: small changes often correspond to a mutation in the institutional setup. 
24 Thus it holds also under monetary policy uncertainty. 
25 In particular, different prescriptions arise from model uncertainty in monetary policy, 
which is studied in a companion paper (see Di Bartolomeo et al. 2007).    14
Some additional results can be easily derived.
26  An increase in 
2
µ σ  is 
associated with higher inflation and unemployment. Moreover, an increase in 
the central bank’s degree of conservativeness raises output and reduces 
inflation, if yy
∗ > . By contrast, a similar increase in the government’s 
degree of conservativeness produces opposite effects on both variables.  
The above result may have important policy implications for the design of 
institutions, in terms of target assignment or optimal policy mix, and for the 
recent debate about the conservative central banker.  
Our model suggests that the minimization of the average inflation and output 
gap deviations from the targets should imply a complete separation of tasks: 
The central bank should be interested only in inflation stabilization and the 
government in output stabilization. Formally,  0 B θ =  and  G θ →+∞. This 
policy mix will lead to the following outcomes: 




aa b cy bc y
Ey









(12)  () E π π
∗ =    
By comparing the outcomes of (11)-(12) to the case of additive uncertainty 




27 the difference between the two forms of uncertainty for expected values 
is only in terms of output and the additional cost of multiplicative uncertain 
can be measured as  () ()
1 *2 2 2 2 2 2 () kE y y b c a a b cb c y y µµ σσ
− ∗ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =− = + + − .  
It is finally worth noticing two further properties of the model regarding the 
                                                 
26 See Appendix A.   15
(optimal) design of the institutions. First, although, complete separation of 
tasks minimizes the average outcomes, it does not necessarily minimize a 
quadratic social welfare, as we will show in the next section. Second, 
monetary and fiscal coordination does not solve the multiplicative 
uncertainty bias. In fact, even if the government and the central bank 




4. Welfare analysis 
In the above section we have shown that an ultra-populist government and an 
ultra-conservative central bank minimize the expected values of the 
deviations of inflation and of real output from their ideal values. However, 
minimum averages do not necessary assure welfare loss minimization, if 
welfare is defined by a quadratic approximation in line with the recent 
literature.
29  
A micro-founded welfare function can be thus written in the following 
form:
30 
                                                                                                                            
27 See D&L (2003b). 
28 The cooperative solution is found by considering the joint minimization of a common loss 
function. However, in our context, the result can be directly verified from equations (7) and 
(8) by setting  12 θ θθ ==. Ideal inflation and real output cannot be achieved for any 
possible value of θ . 
29 See e.g. D&L (2003a), Benigno and Woodford (2005, 2006), Lambertini (2006) for a 
general discussion. 
30 Both social loss (13) and reduced form (2)-(3) coefficients depend on the economy deep 
parameters by the micro-foundation of the model; thus reduced form and social loss 
parameters are interrelated. Full details about this interaction are provided by two appendices 
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=− + −   
where  π
∗ ,  y
∗ ,  W θ   are directly derived from the fundamentals of the 
economy.
31  
By using equations (7), (8) and the rational execution constraint n the welfare 
function, after taking expcatations and a tedious algebra we obtain that in 
equilibrium, equation (13) is:
32  
(14)  [] ( )
[] ()
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The optimal design of institutions, which is obtained by minimizing the 
above expression (equilibrium expected loss) with respect to the inverses of 



















                                                 
31   We disregard the possibly negative effects of the tax (linear) distortions on the 
micro-founded welfare loss. This does not affect our results (See Appendix B). 
32  Note that equation (13) is minimized by substituting equations (7) and (8) and not 
equations (8) and (10) into it, since E(π)
 2 and E(y)
 2 are different from E(π
2) and E(y
2). 
33  From the first order conditions, we obtain two pairs of roots, but only the solution 
immediately below (equations (15) and (16)) implies that the 2 by 2 Hessian matrix is 
positive-semi definite: both the determinant and the trace of the Hessian in (13) and (14) is 
positive; the determinant is instead negative and the trace remains positive (an indeterminate 
Hessian matrix and a saddle point) when considering the other solution. Moreover, solution 
(13) and (14) is a global minimum also if the constrains 0 <  G θ < +∞  and 0 <  B θ < +∞  are 
considered (no corner solutions). Computations are available upon request.   17
(16)  0 B θ
∗ =   
By substituting the above optimal values for the marginal rates of substitution 
in the Nash equilibrium (i.e. equations (9) and (10)) we obtain for real output 

























(18)  () E π π
∗ =   




























According to equations (15) and (16), the minimization of social welfare by 
the fiscal and monetary authorities is sub-optimal. In fact, even if they share 
the same targets, which are the arguments of the social welfare function,  W θ  
is not optimal for  G L  and  B L  (i.e.  GW θ θ
∗ ≠  and  BW θ θ
∗ ≠ ). The result derives 
form the existence of a time consistency problem. Monetary and fiscal 
authorities have to be more conservative than society in order to avoid the 
inflationary temptation and minimize a micro-founded social welfare loss.  
As for the optimal institutional design, equations (15) and (16) require a 
partial division of tasks: the central bank should take care only of inflation 
stabilization, whereas the government should target both real output and 
inflation deviations. However, government conservativeness must be higher 
than the conservativeness of the society in order to avoid the time 
inconsistency problem. Hence, the central bank must be ultraconservative,   18
irrespectively of social preferences, whereas the optimal inverse degree of 




This paper extends a well-known framework of fiscal-monetary interaction 
by considering that policy-makers may face uncertainty on the effects of their 
policies.  
Our main result is that the symbiosis assumption no longer leads to the 
achievement of desired or ideal targets if policy-makers are affected by 
multiplicative uncertainty, unless the desired output is equal to its natural 
level. The difference with the perfect information context is produced by a 
time consistency problem that arises only if multiplicative uncertainty is 
present. Indeed, although we have considered fiscal policy uncertainty and 
the Nash (discretionary) equilibrium, our main result is general since it is 
robust with respect to different sources of multiplicative uncertainty and 
policy regimes. 
Specific additional findings, related to fiscal policy uncertainty and 
simultaneous interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, are that an 
increase in uncertainty raises inflation and reduces real output and that a 
complete separation of task between monetary and fiscal authorities is 
required to minimize the expected values of the outcome deviation from the 
desired values – i.e. the government should be ultra-populist and the central 
bank ultra-conservative.    19
We also show that the minimization of expected target deviations is not 
equivalent to the minimization of the expected welfare loss. By considering 
the expected welfare loss, the optimal institutional design asks for a 
government more conservative than society, so as to eliminate its inflationary 
temptation and solve the time-consistency problem. This result seems to be in 
line with the architecture of the European Monetary Union, based on the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the ECB primary concern on inflation. It is 
also consistent with the consensus on the need to assign an anti-inflationary 
priority to central banks, irrespectively of the governments’ preferences.  
 
Appendix A 
This appendix contains some equations used in the discussion; all of them can 
be easily derived after tedious algebra.  




































1 () GB B ab θθ =+  and 
2
22 (1 ) B B Ab θ =+ .  




































11 2 GB CA A aa c b c µ σ θθ
⎡⎤
⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =+ + + ,    ( )
2 22 2 2 2
22 G CA c a b cc D µ σθ =+ + +  and   20
( )
32
2 0 GB G Da ab c Bc θθ θ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ + + − > .  
In the Nash equilibrium described in the main text, the derivatives of the 
equilibrium outcomes are:  
(A.3)  () ( )
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Appendix B 

















∗,  W θ ,  W ϑ  are directly derived from the fundamentals of the 
economy.  
The optimal degrees of conservativeness that can be derived after simple 
algebra are:  
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The above result confirms the conclusion reached in the main text: the central 
bank should take account of inflation stabilization only, whereas the 
government should target both real output and inflation deviations and adopt 
a degree of conservativeness higher than the social one. By introducing a 
tax-distortion cost in the welfare function, the optimal degree of 
government’s conservativeness should be even higher. The economic 
intuition is trivial.  
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